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Abstract
Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory provide opposite
resolutions of the quantum measurement problem: the former postulates addi-
tional variables (the particle positions) besides the wave function, whereas the
latter implements spontaneous collapses of the wave function by a nonlinear and
stochastic modification of Schro¨dinger’s equation. Still, both theories, when un-
derstood appropriately, share the following structure: They are ultimately not
about wave functions but about ‘matter’ moving in space, represented by either
particle trajectories, fields on space-time, or a discrete set of space-time points.
The role of the wave function then is to govern the motion of the matter.
PACS: 03.65.Ta. Key words: quantum theory without observers; Bohmian me-
chanics; Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory of spontaneous wave function collapse;
primitive ontology; local beables.
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1 Introduction
Bohmian mechanics (BM) and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory are two quan-
tum theories without observers, and thus provide two possible solutions of the mea-
surement problem of quantum mechanics. However, they would seem to have little in
common beyond achieving the goal of describing a possible reality in which observers
would find, for the outcomes of their experiments, the probabilities prescribed by the
quantum formalism. They are two precise, unambiguous fundamental physical theories
that describe and explain the world around us, but they appear to do this by employing
opposite strategies. In Bohmian mechanics (Bohm, 1952; Bell, 1966; Du¨rr et al., 1992;
Berndl et al., 1995) the wave function evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation
but is not the complete description of the state at a given time; this description involves
further variables, traditionally called ‘hidden variables,’ namely the particle positions.
In the GRW theory (Pearle, 1976; Ghirardi et al., 1986; Bell, 1987a; Bassi and Ghirardi,
2003), in contrast, the wave function ψ describes the state of any physical system com-
pletely, but ψ collapses spontaneously, thus departing from the Schro¨dinger evolution.
That is, the two theories choose different horns of the alternative that Bell formulated as
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his conclusion from the measurement problem (Bell, 1987a): ‘Either the wave function,
as given by the Schro¨dinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right.’
The two theories are always presented almost as dichotomical, as in the recent paper
by Putnam (2005). Our suggestion here is instead that BM and GRW theory have much
more in common than one would expect at first sight. So much, indeed, that they
should be regarded as being close to each other, rather than opposite. The differences
are less profound than the similarities, provided that the GRW theory is understood
appropriately, as involving variables describing matter in space-time. These variables
we call the primitive ontology (PO) of the theory, and they form the common structure
of BM and GRW. The gain from the comparison with BM is the insight that the GRW
theory can, and should, be understood in terms of the PO. We think this view in terms
of the PO provides a deeper understanding of the GRW theory in particular, and of
quantum theories without observer in general. To formulate more clearly and advertise
this view is our goal.
After recalling what Bohmian mechanics is in Section 2, we introduce two concrete
examples of GRW theories in Section 3. These examples involve rather different choices
of crucial variables, describing matter in space-time, and give us a sense of the range
of possibilities for such variables. We discuss in Section 4 the notion of the primitive
ontology (PO) of a theory (a notion introduced in (Du¨rr et al., 1992)) and connect it
to Bell’s notion of ‘local beables’ (Bell, 1976). In Section 4.1 we relate the primitive
ontology of a theory to the notion of physical equivalence between theories. We stress
in Section 4.2 the connection, first discussed in (Goldstein, 1998), between the primitive
ontology and symmetry properties, with particular concern for the generalization of such
theories to a relativistically invariant quantum theory without observers. In Section 4.3
we argue that a theory without a primitive ontology is at best profoundly problematical.
We proceed in Sections 5 to an analysis of the differences between GRW (with primitive
ontology) and BM, and in Section 6 we discuss a variety of possible theories. We consider
in Section 7.1 a ‘no-collapse’ reformulation of one of the GRW theories and in Section 7.2
a ‘collapse’ interpretation of BM. These formulations enable us to better appreciate the
common structure of BM and the GRW theories, as well as the differences, as we discuss
in Section 7.3. We conclude in Section 8 with a summary of this common structure.
2 Bohmian Mechanics
Bohmian mechanics is a theory of (nonrelativistic) particles in motion. The motion
of a system of N particles is provided by their world lines t 7→ Qi(t), i = 1, . . . , N ,
where Qi(t) denotes the position in R
3 of the i-th particle at time t. These world lines
are determined by Bohm’s law of motion (Bohm, 1952; Bell, 1966; Du¨rr et al., 1992;
Berndl et al., 1995),
dQi
dt
= vψi (Q1, . . . , QN) =
~
mi
Im
ψ∗∇iψ
ψ∗ψ
(Q1 . . . , QN), (1)
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where mi, i = 1, . . . , N , are the masses of the particles; the wave function ψ evolves
according to Schro¨dinger’s equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= Hψ , (2)
where H is the usual nonrelativistic Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian; for spinless particles it is
of the form
H = −
N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∇2k + V, (3)
containing as parameters the masses of the particles as well as the potential energy
function V of the system.
In the usual yet unfortunate terminology, the actual positions Q1, ..., QN of the par-
ticles are the hidden variables of the theory: the variables which, together with the wave
function, provide a complete description of the system, the wave function alone provid-
ing only a partial, incomplete, description. From the point of view of BM, however, this
is a strange terminology since it suggests that the main object of the theory is the wave
function, with the additional information provided by the particles’ positions playing a
secondary role. The situation is rather much the opposite: BM is a theory of particles;
their positions are the primary variables, and the description in terms of them must be
completed by specifying the wave function to define the dynamics (1).
As a consequence of Schro¨dinger’s equation and of Bohm’s law of motion, the quan-
tum equilibrium distribution |ψ(q)|2 is equivariant. This means that if the configuration
Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . , QN(t)) of a system is random with distribution |ψt|2 at some time t,
then this will be true also for any other time t. Thus, the quantum equilibrium hypoth-
esis, which asserts that whenever a system has wave function ψt, its configuration Q(t)
is random with distribution |ψt|2, can consistently be assumed. This hypothesis is not
as hypothetical as its name may suggest: the quantum equilibrium hypothesis follows,
in fact, by the law of large numbers from the assumption that the (initial) configuration
of the universe is typical (i.e., not-too-special) for the |Ψ|2 distribution, with Ψ the (ini-
tial) wave function of the universe (Du¨rr et al., 1992). The situation resembles the way
Maxwell’s distribution for velocities in a classical gas follows from the assumption that
the phase point of the gas is typical for the uniform distribution on the energy surface.
As a consequence of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, a Bohmian universe, even if
deterministic, appears random to its inhabitants. In fact, the probability distributions
observed by the inhabitants agree exactly with those of the quantum formalism. To
begin to understand why, note that any measurement apparatus must also consist of
Bohmian particles. Calling QS the configuration of the particles of the system to be
measured and QA the configuration of the particles of the apparatus, we can write for
the configuration of the big Bohmian system relevant to the analysis of the measurement
Q = (QS, QA). Let us suppose that the initial wave function ψ of the big system is a
product state Ψ(q) = Ψ(qS, qA) = ψ(qS)φ(qA).
During the measurement, this Ψ evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and
in the case of an ideal measurement it evolves to Ψt =
∑
α ψα φα, where α runs through
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the eigenvalues of the observable measured, φα is a state of the apparatus in which
the pointer points to the value α, and ψα is the projection of ψ to the appropriate
eigenspace of the observable. By the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, the probability
for the random apparatus configuration QA(t) to be such as to correspond to the pointer
pointing to the value α is ‖ψα‖2. For a more detailed discussion see (Du¨rr et al., 1992,
2004b).
3 Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber
The theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) is in agreement with the
predictions of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as far as all present experiments are
concerned (Bassi and Ghirardi, 2003); for a discussion of future experiments that may
distinguish this theory from quantum mechanics, see Section V of (Bassi and Ghirardi,
2003). According to the way in which this theory is usually presented, the evolution of
the wave function follows, instead of Schro¨dinger’s equation, a stochastic jump process
in Hilbert space. We shall succinctly summarize this process as follows.
Consider a quantum system described (in the standard language) by an N -‘particle’1
wave function ψ = ψ(q1, ..., qN), qi ∈ R3, i = 1, . . . , N ; for any point x in R3 (the ‘center’
of the collapse that will be defined next), define on the Hilbert space of the system the
collapse operator
Λi(x) =
1
(2πσ2)3/2
e−
( bQi−x)
2
2σ2 , (4)
where Q̂i is the position operator of ‘particle’ i. Here σ is a new constant of nature of
order of 10−7m.
Let ψt0 be the initial wave function, i.e., the normalized wave function at some time
t0 arbitrarily chosen as initial time. Then ψ evolves in the following way:
1. It evolves unitarily, according to Schro¨dinger’s equation, until a random time
T1 = t0 +∆T1, so that
ψT1 = U∆T1ψt0 , (5)
where Ut is the unitary operator Ut = e
− i
~
Ht corresponding to the standard Hamil-
tonian H governing the system, e.g., given by (3) for N spinless particles, and ∆T1
is a random time distributed according to the exponential distribution with rate
Nλ (where the quantity λ is another constant of nature of the theory,2 of order of
10−15 s−1).
2. At time T1 it undergoes an instantaneous collapse with random center X1 and
1We wish to emphasize here that there are no particles in this theory: the word ‘particle’ is used
only for convenience in order to be able to use the standard notation and terminology.
2Pearle and Squires (1994) have argued that λ should be chosen differently for every ‘particle,’ with
λi proportional to the mass mi.
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random label I1 according to
ψT1 7→ ψT1+ =
ΛI1(X1)
1/2ψT1
‖ΛI1(X1)
1/2ψT1‖
. (6)
I1 is chosen at random in the set {1, . . . , N} with uniform distribution. The center
of the collapse X1 is chosen randomly with probability distribution
3
P(X1 ∈ dx1|ψT1 , I1 = i1) = 〈ψT1 |Λi1(x1)ψT1〉 dx1 = ‖Λi1(x1)
1/2ψT1‖
2dx1. (7)
3. Then the algorithm is iterated: ψT1+ evolves unitarily until a random time T2 =
T1+∆T2, where ∆T2 is a random time (independent of ∆T1) distributed according
to the exponential distribution with rate Nλ, and so on.
In other words, the evolution of the wave function is the Schro¨dinger evolution in-
terrupted by collapses. When the wave function is ψ a collapse with center x and label
i occurs at rate
r(x, i|ψ) = λ 〈ψ |Λi(x)ψ〉 (8)
and when this happens, the wave function changes to Λi(x)
1/2ψ/‖Λi(x)1/2ψ‖.
Thus, if between time t0 and any time t > t0, n collapses have occurred at the times
t0 < T1 < T2 < . . . < Tn < t, with centers X1, . . . , Xn and labels I1, . . . , In, the wave
function at time t will be
ψt =
LFnt,t0ψt0
‖LFnt,t0ψt0‖
(9)
where Fn = {(X1, T1, I1), . . . , (Xn, Tn, In)} and
LFnt,t0 = Ut−TnΛIn(Xn)
1/2 UTn−Tn−1ΛIn−1(Xn−1)
1/2 UTn−1−Tn−2 · · ·ΛI1(X1)
1/2 UT1−t0 . (10)
Since Ti, Xi, Ii and n are random, ψt is also random.
It should be observed that—unless t0 is the initial time of the universe—also ψt0
should be regarded as random, being determined by the collapses that occurred at
times earlier that t0. However, given ψt0 , the statistics of the future evolution of the
wave function is completely determined; for example, the joint distribution of the first
n collapses after t0, with particle labels I1, . . . , In ∈ {1, . . . , N}, is
P
(
X1 ∈ dx1, T1 ∈ dt1, I1 = i1, . . . , Xn ∈ dxn, Tn ∈ dtn, In = in|ψt0
)
=
λne−Nλ(tn−t0)‖Lfntn,t0ψt0‖
2 dx1dt1 · · · dxndtn , (11)
with fn = {(x1, t1, i1), . . . , (xn, tn, in)} and L
fn
tn,t0 given, mutatis mutandis, by (10).
3Hereafter, when no ambiguity could arise, we use the standard notations of probability theory,
according to which a capital letter, such as X , is used to denote a random variable, while the the values
taken by it are denoted by small letters; X ∈ dx is a shorthand for X ∈ [x, x + dx], etc.
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This is, more or less, all there is to say about the formulation of the GRW theory
according to most theorists. In contrast, GianCarlo Ghirardi believes that the descrip-
tion provided above is not the whole story, and we agree with him. We believe that,
depending on the choice of what we call the primitive ontology (PO) of the theory, there
are correspondingly different versions of the theory. We will discuss the notion of prim-
itive ontology in detail in Section 4. In the subsections below we present two versions
of the GRW theory, based on two different choices of the PO, namely the matter density
ontology (in Section 3.1) and the flash ontology (in Section 3.2).
3.1 GRWm
In the first version of the GRW theory, denoted by GRWm, the PO is given by a field:
We have a variable m(x, t) for every point x ∈ R3 in space and every time t, defined by
m(x, t) =
N∑
i=1
mi
∫
R3N
dq1 · · · dqN δ(qi − x)
∣∣ψ(q1, . . . , qN , t)∣∣2 . (12)
In words, one starts with the |ψ|2–distribution in configuration space R3N , then obtains
the marginal distribution of the i-th degree of freedom qi ∈ R3 by integrating out all
other variables qj , j 6= i, multiplies by the mass associated with qi, and sums over i.
GRWm was essentially proposed by Ghirardi and co–workers in (Benatti et al., 1995);4
see also (Goldstein, 1998).
The field m(·, t) is supposed to be understood as the density of matter in space at
time t. Since these variables are functionals of the wave function ψ, they are not ‘hidden
variables’ since, unlike the positions in BM, they need not be specified in addition to the
wave function, but rather are determined by it. Nonetheless, they are additional ele-
ments of the GRW theory that need to be posited in order to have a complete description
of the world in the framework of that theory.
GRWm is a theory about the behavior of a field m(·, t) on three-dimensional space.
The microscopic description of reality provided by the matter density field m(·, t) is not
particle-like but instead continuous, in contrast to the particle ontology of BM. This is
reminiscent of Schro¨dinger’s early view of the wave function as representing a continuous
matter field. But while Schro¨dinger was obliged to abandon his early view because of
the tendency of the wave function to spread, the spontaneous wave function collapses
built into the GRW theory tend to localize the wave function, thus counteracting this
tendency and overcoming the problem.
A parallel with BM begins to emerge: they both essentially involve more than the
wave function. In one the matter is spread out continuously, while in the other it
is concentrated in finitely many particles; however, both theories are concerned with
matter in three-dimensional space, and in some regions of space there is more than in
others.
4They first proposed (for a model slightly more complicated than the one considered here) that
the matter density be given by an expression similar to (12) but this difference is not relevant for our
purposes.
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You may find GRWm a surprising proposal. You may ask, was it not the point of
GRW — perhaps even its main advantage over BM — that it can do without objects
beyond the wave function, such as particle trajectories or matter density? Is not the
dualism present in GRWm unnecessary? That is, what is wrong with the version of the
GRW theory, which we call GRW0, which involves just the wave function and nothing
else? We will return to these questions in Section 4.3. To be sure, it seems that if there
was nothing wrong with GRW0, then, by simplicity, it should be preferable to GRWm.
We stress, however, that Ghirardi must regard GRW0 as seriously deficient; otherwise
he would not have proposed anything like GRWm. We will indicate in Section 4.3 why
we think Ghirardi is correct. To establish the inadequacy of GRW0 is not, however, the
main point of this paper.
3.2 GRWf
According to another version of the GRW theory, which was first suggested by Bell
(1987a, 1989), then adopted in (Kent, 1989; Goldstein, 1998; Tumulka, 2006a,b; Allori et al.,
2005; Maudlin, forthcoming), and here denoted GRWf, the PO is given by ‘events’ in
space-time called flashes, mathematically described by points in space-time. This is,
admittedly, an unusual PO, but it is a possible one nonetheless. In GRWf matter is
neither made of particles following world lines, such as in classical or Bohmian mechan-
ics, nor of a continuous distribution of matter such as in GRWm, but rather of discrete
points in space-time, in fact finitely many points in every bounded space-time region,
see Figure 1.
x
t
Figure 1: A typical pattern of flashes in space-time, and thus a possible world according
to the GRWf theory
In the GRWf theory, the space-time locations of the flashes can be read off from the
history of the wave function given by (9) and (10): every flash corresponds to one of the
spontaneous collapses of the wave function, and its space-time location is just the space-
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time location of that collapse. Accordingly, equation (11) gives the joint distribution of
the first n flashes, after some initial time t0. The flashes form the set
F = {(X1, T1), . . . , (Xk, Tk), . . .}
(with T1 < T2 < . . .).
In Bell’s words:
[...] the GRW jumps (which are part of the wave function, not something
else) are well localized in ordinary space. Indeed each is centered on a par-
ticular spacetime point (x, t). So we can propose these events as the basis of
the ‘local beables’ of the theory. These are the mathematical counterparts
in the theory to real events at definite places and times in the real world (as
distinct from the many purely mathematical constructions that occur in the
working out of physical theories, as distinct from things which may be real
but not localized, and distinct from the ‘observables’ of other formulations
of quantum mechanics, for which we have no use here). A piece of matter
then is a galaxy of such events. (Bell, 1987a)
That is, Bell’s idea is that GRW can account for objective reality in three-dimensional
space in terms of space-time points (Xk, Tk) that correspond to the localization events
(collapses) of the wave function. Note that if the number N of the degrees of freedom in
the wave function is large, as in the case of a macroscopic object, the number of flashes is
also large (if λ = 10−15 s−1 and N = 1023, we obtain 108 flashes per second). Therefore,
for a reasonable choice of the parameters of the GRWf theory, a cubic centimeter of solid
matter contains more than 108 flashes per second. That is to say that large numbers of
flashes can form macroscopic shapes, such as tables and chairs. That is how we find an
image of our world in GRWf.
Note however that at almost every time space is in fact empty, containing no flashes
and thus no matter. Thus, while the atomic theory of matter entails that space is not
everywhere continuously filled with matter but rather is largely void, GRWf entails that
at most times space is entirely void.
According to this theory, the world is made of flashes and the wave function serves
as the tool to generate the ‘law of evolution’ for the flashes: equation (8) gives the rate
of the flash process —the probability per unit time of the flash of label i occurring at
the point x. For this reason, we prefer the word ‘flash’ to ‘hitting’ or ‘collapse center’:
the latter words suggest that the role of these events is to affect the wave function,
or that they are not more than certain facts about the wave function, whereas ‘flash’
suggests rather something like an elementary event. Since the wave function ψ evolves
in a random way, F = {(Xk, Tk) : k ∈ N} is a random subset of space-time, a point
process in space-time, as probabilists would say. GRWf is thus a theory whose output
is a point process in space-time.5
5An anonymous referee has remarked that according to GRWf with the original parameters, in a
single living cell there might occur as few as one flash per hour, so that the cell is empty of matter
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3.3 Empirical Equivalence Between GRWm and GRWf
We remark that GRWm and GRWf are empirically equivalent, i.e., they make always and
exactly the same predictions for the outcomes of experiments. In other words, there is
no experiment we could possibly perform that would tell us whether we are in a GRWm
world or in a GRWf world, assuming we are in one of the two. This should be contrasted
with the fact that there are possible experiments (though we cannot perform any with
the present technology) that decide whether we are in a Bohmian world or in a GRW
world.
The reason is simple. Consider any experiment, which is finished at time t. Consider
the same realization of the wave function on the time interval [0, t], but associated with
different primitive ontologies in the two worlds. At time t, the result gets written
down, encoded in the shape of the ink; more abstractly, the result gets encoded in the
position of some macroscopic amount of matter. If in the GRWf ontology, this matter
is in position 1, then the flashes must be located in position 1; thus, the collapses are
centered at position 1; thus, the wave function is near zero at position 2; thus, by (12)
the density of matter is low at position 2 and high at position 1; thus, in GRWm the
matter is also in position 1, displaying the same result as in the GRWf world.
We will discuss empirical equivalence again in Section 7.3.
4 Primitive Ontology
The matter density field in GRWm, the flashes in GRWf, and the particle trajectories
in BM have something in common: they form (what we have called) the primitive
ontology of these theories. The PO of a theory—and its behavior— is what the theory
is fundamentally about. It is closely connected with what Bell called the ‘local beables’:
[I]n the words of Bohr, ‘it is decisive to recognize that, however far the
phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account
for surprisingly long periods, quite against our intuition of a cell as a rather classical object. We make
a few remarks to this objection. First, one should of course be careful with the language: there is
presumably no cell in GRWf, though the structure of the wave function (on configuration space—even
though there are no configurations) might suggest otherwise. Second, it all depends on the choice of
the parameters λ and σ, and, as long as experiments have not fixed their values, this cell argument may
indeed be an argument for a choice different from GRW’s original one (say, with larger λ and larger
σ). We do not wish to argue here for any particular choice. Third, while most people might expect a
cell to be real in much the same way as (say) a cat, one would not necessarily expect this of a single
atom. Thus, it seems quite conceivable that, at some critical scale between that of atoms and that of
cats, the ontological character of objects changes—as indeed it does in GRWf because of the limited
resolution of matter given by the space-time density of flashes (e.g., in water approximately one flash
every 20 micrometers every second). The cell example shows that the critical scale in GRWf is larger
than one might have expected, and thus that GRWf is a mildly quirky picture of the world. But this
mild quirkiness should be seen in perspective. In comparison, many other views about quantum reality
are heavily eccentric, as they propose that reality is radically different from what we normally think
it is like: e.g., that there exist parallel worlds, or that there exists no matter at all, or that reality is
contradictory in itself.
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of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms’. It is the ambition of
the theory of local beables to bring these ‘classical terms’ into the equations,
and not relegate them entirely to the surrounding talk. (Bell, 1976)
The elements of the primitive ontology are the stuff that things are made of. The wave
function also belongs to the ontology of GRWm, GRWf and BM, but not to the PO:
according to these theories physical objects are not made of wave functions6. Instead,
the role of the wave function in these theories is quite different, as we will see in the
following.
In each of these theories, the only reason the wave function is of any interest at all
is that it is relevant to the behavior of the PO. Roughly speaking, the wave function
tells the matter how to move. In BM the wave function determines the motion of the
particles via equation (1), in GRWm the wave function determines the distribution of
matter in the most immediate way via equation (12), and in GRWf the wave function
determines the probability distribution of the future flashes via equation (11).
We now see a clear parallel between BM and the GRW theory, at least in its versions
GRWm and GRWf. Each of these theories is about matter in space-time, what might
be called a decoration of space-time. Each involves a dual structure (X , ψ): the PO
X providing the decoration, and the wave function ψ governing the PO. The wave
function in each of these theories, which has the role of generating the dynamics for
the PO, has a nomological character utterly absent in the PO. This difference is crucial
for understanding the symmetry properties of these theories and therefore is vital for
the construction of a Lorentz invariant quantum theory without observers, as we will
discuss in Section 4.2.
Even the Copenhagen interpretation (orthodox quantum theory, OQT) involves a
dual structure: what might be regarded as its PO is the classical description of macro-
scopic objects which Bohr insisted was indispensable — including in particular pointer
orientations conveying the outcomes of experiments — with the wave function serving
to determine the probability relations between the successive states of these objects. In
this way, ψ governs a PO, even for OQT. An important difference, however, between
OQT on the one hand and BM, GRWm, and GRWf on the other is that the latter are
fully precise about what belongs to the PO (particle trajectories, respectively continuous
matter density or flashes) whereas the Copenhagen interpretation is rather vague, even
noncommittal, on this point, since the notion of ‘macroscopic’ is an intrinsically vague
one: of how many atoms need an object consist in order to be macroscopic? And, what
exactly constitutes a ‘classical description’ of a macroscopic object?
Therefore, as the example of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics makes vivid, an adequate fundamental physical theory, one with any pretension to
precision, must involve a PO defined on the microscopic scale.
6We would not go so far as Dowker and Herbauts (2005) and Nelson (1985), who have suggested
that, physically, the wave function does not exist at all, and only the PO exists. But we have to admit
that this view is a possibility, in fact a more serious one than the widespread view that no PO exists.
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4.1 Primitive Ontology and Physical Equivalence
To appreciate the concept of PO, it might be useful to regard the positions of particles,
the mass density and the flashes, respectively, as the output of BM, GRWm and GRWf,
with the wave function, in contrast, serving as part of an algorithm that generates
this output. Suppose we want to write a computer program for simulating a system
(or a universe) according to a certain theory. For writing the program, we have to
face the question: Which among the many variables to compute should be the output
of the program? All other variables are internal variables of the program: they may
be necessary for doing the computation, but they are not what the user is interested
in. In the way we propose to understand BM, GRWm, and GRWf, the output of the
program, the result of the simulation, should be the particle world lines, the m(·, t)
field, respectively the flashes; the output should look like Figure 1. The wave function,
in contrast, is one of the internal variables and its role is to implement the evolution for
the output, the PO of the theory.
Moreover, note that there might be different ways of producing the same output,
using different internal variables. For example, two wave functions that differ by a
gauge transformation generate the same law for the PO. In more detail, when (external)
magnetic fields are incorporated into BM by replacing all derivatives ∇k in (1) and (2)
by ∇k− iekA(qk), where A is the vector potential and ek is the electric charge of particle
k, then the gauge transformation
ψ 7→ ei
P
k ekf(qk)ψ , A 7→ A+∇f (13)
does not change the trajectories nor the quantum equilibrium distribution. As another
example, one can write the law for the PO in either the Schro¨dinger or the Heisenberg
picture. As a consequence, the same law for the PO is generated by either an evolving
wave function and static operators or a static wave function and evolving operators. In
more detail, BM can be reformulated in the Heisenberg picture by rewriting the law of
motion as follows:
dQi
dt
= −
1
~
Im
〈ψ|P (dq, t)[H, Q̂i(t)]|ψ〉
〈ψ|P (dq, t)|ψ〉
(q = Q(t)) , (14)
where H is the Hamiltonian (e.g., for N spinless particles given by (3)), Q̂i(t) is the
(Heisenberg-evolved) position operator (or, more precisely, triple of operators corre-
sponding to the three dimensions of physical space) for particle i and P (·, t) is the
projection–valued measure (PVM) defined by the joint spectral decomposition of all
(Heisenberg-evolved) position operators (Du¨rr et al., 2005b).
We suggest that two theories be regarded as physically equivalent when they lead
to the same history of the PO. Conversely, one could define the notion of PO in terms
of physical equivalence: The PO is described by those variables which remain invariant
under all physical equivalences. We discuss this issue in more detail in Sections 7.1 and
7.2, when presenting some examples.
What is ‘primitive’ about the primitive ontology? That becomes clear when we
realize in what way the other objects in the theory (such as the wave function, or the
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magnetic field in classical physics) are non–primitive: One can explain what they are
by explaining how they govern the behavior of the PO, while it is the entities of the PO
that make direct contact with the world of our experience. We can directly compare the
motion of matter in our world with the motion of matter in the theory, at least on the
macroscopic scale. The other objects in the theory can be compared to our world only
indirectly, by the way they affect the PO.7
4.2 Primitive Ontology and Symmetry
The peculiar flash ontology was invented by Bell in 1987 as a step toward a relativistic
GRW theory. He wrote in (Bell, 1987a) about GRWf:
I am particularly struck by the fact that the model is as Lorentz invariant
as it could be in the nonrelativistic version. It takes away the ground of my
fear that any exact formulation of quantum mechanics must conflict with
fundamental Lorentz invariance.
What Bell refers to in the above quotation is the following. An analogue of the relativity
of simultaneity, i.e. of the invariance of the dynamics under boosts, in the framework
of a nonrelativistic theory is the invariance under relative time translations for two very
distant systems. Bell (1987a, 1989) verified by direct calculation that GRWf has this
symmetry. However, it it is important here to appreciate what this invariance means.
To say that a theory has a given symmetry is to say that
The possible histories of the PO, those that are allowed by the theory, when
transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible histories for
the theory, and the possible probability distributions on the histories, those
that are allowed by the theory, when transformed according to the symmetry,
will again be possible probability distributions for the theory.
Let us explain.
• ‘The possible histories of the PO, those that are allowed by the theory. . . ’ We
give some examples, involving Galilean invariance. In classical mechanics the
meaning is straightforward: the PO is that of particles, described by their positions
in physical space, a history of this PO corresponds to a collection of particle
trajectories—the trajectories Qi(t), i = 1, . . . , N , in a universe of N particles—
and a history is allowed if the particles obey Newton’s law, i.e., if miQ¨i(t) =
Fi(Q1(t), ..., QN (t)), where Fi is the Newtonian force acting on the ith particle.
7While the notion of PO is similar to Bell’s notion of local beables, it should be observed that
not all local beables, such as the electric and magnetic fields in classical electrodynamics, need to be
regarded as part of the PO. Moreover, the very conception that the PO must involve only local beables
(i.e., be represented by mathematical objects grounded in familiar three-dimensional space) could in
principle be questioned; this is, however, a rather delicate and difficult question that will be briefly
addressed in Section 4.3 but that deserves a thorough analysis that will be undertaken in a separate
work (Allori et al., unpublished,b).
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The theory is defined once the form of Fi is specified (for example, that the force
is the Newtonian gravitational force).
Consider now BM: also here the PO is that of particles and a possible history of the
PO—one that is allowed by BM—is a history described by the particle trajectories
Qi(t), i = 1, . . . N , which satisfy equation (1) for some wave function ψ satisfying
equation (2). The theory is defined once the Hamiltonian H in (2) is specified (for
example, as given by (3), for a choice of the potential V ).
• ‘. . . when transformed according to the symmetry. . . ’ Since the PO is represented
by a geometrical entity in physical space (a decoration of space-time, as we have
said earlier), space-time symmetries naturally act on it, for example transforming
trajectories Qi(t) to trajectories Q˜i(t). For example, under a Galilean boost (by a
relative velocity v), in classical mechanics as well as in BM, the trajectories Qi(t)
transform into the boosted trajectories Q˜i(t) = Qi(t) + vt.
• ‘. . . will again be possible histories for the theory. . . ’ Notice that Qi(t) and Q˜i(t)
may arise in BM from different wave functions. In other words, the wave function
must also be transformed when transforming the history of the PO. However, while
there is a natural transformation of the history of the PO, there is not necessarily a
corresponding natural change of the wave function. The latter is allowed to change
in any way, solely determined by its relationship to the PO. For example, consider
again a Galilean boost (by a relative velocity v) in BM: the boosted trajectories
Q˜i(t) = Qi(t) + vt form again a solution of (1) and (2) with ψ replaced by the
transformed wave function8
ψ˜t(q1, . . . , qN) = exp
(
i
~
N∑
i=1
mi(qi · v −
1
2
v2t)
)
ψt(q1 − vt, . . . , qN − vt). (15)
Since the trajectories of the PO transformed according to the symmetry are still
solutions, BM is symmetric under Galilean transformation, even though the cor-
responding wave function has to undergo more than a simple change of variables
in order to make this possible.
• ‘. . . and the possible probability distributions on the histories, those that are al-
lowed by the theory. . . ’ In a deterministic theory, a probability distribution on the
histories arises from a probability distribution on the initial conditions. In BM,
a probability distribution on histories is possible if there exists a wave function
ψ such that the given distribution is the one induced on solutions to (1) by the
probability distribution |ψ(q1, . . . , qN)|2 at some initial time.
More interesting is the case of nondeterministic theories. For these theories, i.e.,
for theories involving stochasticity at the fundamental level, the law for the PO
8 Under this transformation V = V (q1, . . . , qN ) in (2) must be replaced by V˜ = V (q1−vt, . . . , qN−vt).
For V arising from the standard two-body interactions, we have that V = V˜ , and hence the theory is
invariant.
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amounts to a specification of possible probability distributions, for example by
specifying the generator, or transition probabilities, of a Markov process. For
example, in GRWm the history of the PO is the mass density field m(·, ·), and a
probability distribution on the histories of this PO is possible if it is the distribution
induced on m(·, ·), according to equation (12), by some wave function ψ with
probability law given, say, by (11) (and (9)). The case of GRWf is analogous:
a probability distribution for the flashes F = {(Xk, Tk) : k ∈ N} is possible if
induced by (11) for some wave function ψ.
• ‘. . . when transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible probability
distributions for the theory.’ The probability distribution on the histories, when
transformed according to the symmetry, is the distribution of the transformed his-
tories. In other words, the action of a transformation on every history determines
the transformation of a probability distribution on the space of histories. As in the
deterministic case, the wave function is allowed to change in any way compatible
with its relationship to the PO. For example, consider the Galilean invariance of
GRWf: let ψ and ψ˜ be two initial wave functions related as in (15), that is, by the
usual formula for Galilean transformations in quantum mechanics. Let Gt denote
the transformation operator in (15) at time t, such that ψ˜t = Gtψt. A simple
calculation shows that
Λi(x+ vt)
1/2Gt = GtΛi(x)
1/2.
As a consequence, the distribution (7) of the (spatial location of the) first flash
arising from ψ˜T1 is that arising from ψT1 shifted by vT1, and the post-collapse wave
functions (6) are still related by the appropriate Gt operator, i.e.,
ψ˜T1+ = GT1ψT1+.
Thus, the joint distribution of flashes arising from ψ˜ is just the one arising from
ψ shifted by vt for every t.
Going back to the work of Bell mentioned in the beginning of this section (Bell,
1987a), what Bell had to do for GRWf, and what he did, was to confirm the invariance
under relative time translations of the stochastic law for F = {(Xk, Tk) : k ∈ N}, the
galaxy of flashes. And more generally the invariance of GRWf directly concerns the
stochastic law for the PO; it concerns the invariance of the law for the wave function
only indirectly, contrary to what is often, erroneously, believed. Under a space-time
symmetry the PO must be transformed in accord with its intrinsic geometrical nature,
while wave functions (and other elements of the non-primitive ontology, if any) should
be transformed in a manner dictated by their relationship to the PO.
Moreover, note that there is no reason to believe that when changing the PO of
a theory the symmetry properties of the theory will remain unchanged. Actually, the
opposite is true. This fact was pointed out in (Goldstein, 1998) and has recently been
emphasized also in (Tumulka, 2006a), in which it has been shown that GRWf, without
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interaction, can be modified so as to become a relativistic quantum theory without
observers.9 In that paper the stochastic law for the galaxy of the flashes in space-time,
the PO of GRWf, with suitably modified, Lorentz-invariant equations, has been shown
explicitly to be relativistically invariant (see also Tumulka, 2006c). Hence, GRWf is
Lorentz invariant, but GRWm is not. Thus, one should not ask whether GRW as such
is Lorentz invariant, since the answer to this question depends on the choice of PO for
GRW. For details see (Maudlin, forthcoming). Similar results to those of (Tumulka,
2006a) have been obtained also by Dowker and Henson (2004) for a relativistic collapse
theory on the lattice (see also Dowker and Herbauts, 2004, 2005).
We conclude with some remarks on OQT. Here the relevant PO consists, rather
vaguely of course, of the ‘pointer variables’ registering the results of experiments that
are spoken of as measurements of quantum observables. Though OQT provides neither
detailed histories of the PO nor probability distributions thereof, it does provide prob-
ability distributions for the results of measurements registered by the PO, which are
given by the appropriate spectral measures for the self-adjoint operators representing
the observables. In particular, the mean value of the result of the measurement E of the
quantum observable represented by the self-adjoint operator A for a system in the state
ψ is
< A >ψ=
〈ψ |Aψ〉
〈ψ |ψ〉
. (16)
Now consider the action of a symmetry on the experiment E : it transforms E to the
experiment E˜ arising from the natural action of the symmetry on the physical processes
defining E . If E is a measurement of the operator A—that is, if the probability distri-
bution of the results of E are given by the spectral measures for A—then E˜ will be a
measurement of the operator A˜ arising from A under the symmetry. While E and E˜
are of course (usually) different experiments, it is obvious from their relationship that
the distribution of the results of E when the system is in the state ψ is the same as the
distribution of the results of E˜ when the transformed system is in the transformed state
ψ˜. In particular, where E is a measurement of A, we have that
< A >ψ=
〈ψ |Aψ〉
〈ψ |ψ〉
=
〈ψ˜ |A˜ψ˜〉
〈ψ˜ | ψ˜〉
=< A˜ >ψ˜ . (17)
According to the analysis of Wigner (1939) and Bargmann (1954), these transformations
on wave functions and operators are given by unitary or anti-unitary operators U , i.e.,
ψ˜ = Uψ, A˜ = UAU−1, where U is an element of a unitary-projective representation of
the symmetry group.
9To put this result into perspective, note that the absence of interaction does not make the prob-
lem trivial. On the contrary, the main difficulty with devising a relativistic quantum theory without
observers arises already in the non-interacting case: To specify a law for the PO that is relativistic
but nonlocal. Note further that it would not have sufficed to specify a Lorentz-invariant evolution law
for ψ (entailing suitable collapse) while leaving open the law for the PO. Finally, note that for GRWm
and BM it is not known how to make them “seriously” relativistic, i.e. without the incorporation of
additional structure that yields a foliation of space-time.
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Note that while the distribution of the result of the experiment is, for trivial reasons,
unaffected by the symmetry transformation, the macroscopic PO is in fact transformed.
For example, a rotated experiment will involve a rotated ‘pointer position,’ or a rotated
computer printout. But what the pointer is pointing to, and what the printout says,
will not change. In other words, the numerical result Z of an experiment E should not
be confused with the macroscopic configuration M of the pointer variables, the PO of
OQT, the former being indeed a function of the latter, i.e., Z = f(M), with the function
f expressing the ‘calibration’ of the experiment. In E˜ , the rotated experiment, the PO
(the pointer orientation) changes together with the calibration: the pointer points in a
different direction M˜ and the scale f is rotated into f˜ such that f˜(M˜) = f(M).
Thus, when all is said and done, although the PO of OQT is rather vague and
imprecise, insofar as symmetry is concerned the situation is indeed analogous to that of
theories, such as BM or GRWf, having a clear and exactly specified PO: also for OQT the
possible probability distributions on the PO, those that are allowed by the theory, when
transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible probability distributions
for the theory.
4.3 Without Primitive Ontology
Now let us turn to the question: What is wrong with GRW0, the bare version of GRW,
which involves just the wave function and nothing else? Why does one need a PO at all?
Our answer is that we do not see how the existence and behavior of tables and chairs
and the like could be accounted for without positing a primitive ontology—a description
of matter in space and time.
The aim of a fundamental physical theory is, we believe, to describe the world around
us, and in so doing to explain our experiences to the extent of providing an account of
their macroscopic counterparts, an account of the behavior of objects in 3-space. Thus
it seems that for a fundamental physical theory to be satisfactory, it must involve, and
fundamentally be about, ‘local beables,’ and not just a beable such as the wave function,
which is non-local: In the words of Bell (1987a)
[...] the wave function as a whole lives in a much bigger space, of 3N dimen-
sions. It makes no sense to ask for the amplitude or phase or whatever of
the wave function at a point in ordinary space. It has neither amplitude nor
phase nor anything else until a multitude of points in ordinary three-space
are specified.
In contrast, if a law is, like the GRW process in Hilbert space, about a mathematical
object, like ψ, living in some abstract space, like R3N , it seems necessary to have or
to add something more in order to make contact with a description in 3-space. For
example, formulations of classical mechanics utilizing configuration space R3N or phase
space R6N (such as Euler–Lagrange’s or Hamilton’s) are connected to a PO in 3-space
(particles with trajectories) by the definitions of configuration space and phase space.
If, as we believe, a PO given by local beables is so crucial for a theory to make sense as
a fundamental physical theory, one might wonder how GRW0 could be taken seriously
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by so many serious people (see, e.g., Albert, 1992, 1996; Nicrosini and Rimini, 2003;
Lewis, 2005). One reason, perhaps, is that if the wave function ψ is suitably collapsed,
i.e., concentrated on a subset S of configuration space such that all configurations in S
look macroscopically the same, all corresponding for example to a pointer pointing in
the same way, then we can easily imagine what a world in the state ψ is macroscopically
like: namely like the macrostate defined by configurations from S. For example, when
in GRW0 the wave function is concentrated near q, where q is a configuration describing
a pointer pointing to the value a, it is easy to feel justified in concluding that there is a
pointer that is pointing to the value a, and to forget that we are dealing with a theory
for which there exists no arrangement of stuff in physical three-dimensional space at all.
Since the macroscopic description does not depend on whether the PO consists of
world lines, flashes, or a continuous distribution of matter, and since the reasoning
does not even mention the PO, it is easy to overlook the fact that a further law needs
to be invoked, one which prescribes how the wave function is related to the PO, and
implies that for wave functions such as described, the PO is such that its macroscopic
appearance coincides (very probably) with the macroscopic appearance of configurations
in S. To overlook this step is even easier when focusing very much on the measurement
problem, whose central difficulty is that the wave function of object plus apparatus, if
it evolves linearly, typically becomes a superposition of macroscopically distinct wave
functions like ψ which thus contains no hint of the actual outcome of the experiment.
Interestingly enough, after having underlined the importance of local beables for
a fundamental physical theory, Bell proposed GRW to be about ‘stuff’ in configura-
tion (3N -dimensional) space. In his celebrated analysis of the quantum measurement
problem (Bell, 1990), he wrote:
The GRW-type theories have nothing in their kinematics but the wavefunc-
tion. It gives the density (in a multidimensional configuration space!) of
stuff. To account for the narrowness of that stuff in macroscopic dimensions,
the linear Schro¨dinger equation has to be modified, in the GRW picture by
a mathematically prescribed spontaneous collapse mechanism. [Emphasis in
the original.]
He made a similar remark to Ghirardi (quoted by the latter in (Bassi and Ghirardi,
2003, p. 345)) in a letter dated October 3, 1989:
As regards ψ and the density of stuff, I think it is important that this density
is in the 3N -dimensional configuration space. So I have not thought of
relating it to ordinary matter or charge density in 3-space. Even for one
particle I think one would have problems with the latter. So I am inclined
to the view you mention ‘as it is sufficient for an objective interpretation’
... And it has to be stressed that the ‘stuff’ is in 3N -space—or whatever
corresponds in field theory.
As we have indicated already, we don’t understand this proposal, which clearly suffers
from the difficulties discussed above. Whoever suggests that matter exists not in 3-space
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but in 3N -space must bridge the gap between an ontology in 3N -space and the behavior
of objects in 3-space. Strategies for doing so have in fact been proposed; see (Albert,
1996) for a proposal and (Monton, 2002) for a critique. For the reasons mentioned
above, we do not believe that they can succeed.
4.4 Primitive Ontology and Quantum State
It is well known that in OQT the quantum state is naturally projective. That is, quantum
states are best regarded as mathematically represented by rays in the system’s Hilbert
space H , i.e. by the elements of the projective space P(H ), consisting of equivalence
classes of wave functions ψ ∈ H differing by a multiplicative constant. This follows
from the rule (16) for the mean value of an observable represented by a self-adjoint
operator A for a system in the state ψ. Wave functions ψ differing by a multiplicative
constant give the same mean value to all observables A.
Similarly, in BM the quantum state is naturally projective: it follows from (1) that
wave functions differing by a multiplicative constant are associated with the same vector
field, and thus generate the same dynamics for the PO.10
In GRWf the quantum state is also naturally projective. Of course, for general ψ
(not necessarily normalized), instead of (8) the rate for the flashes should be given by
r(x, i|ψ) = λ
〈ψ |Λi(x)ψ〉
〈ψ |ψ〉
. (18)
In GRWm wave functions differing by a multiplicative constant of modulus 1 define
the same evolution of the mass density field (12). If the wave function is multiplied
by a more general constant, in order to ensure the same evolution of the mass density
the right hand side of (12) could be divided by 〈ψ|ψ〉. But this is perhaps unnecessary,
since universal mass densities that differ only by a multiplicative constant are arguably
physically equivalent.
GRW0, involving only wave functions, does not allow us to make the same kind of
argument; it is thus not clear for GRW0 why ψ should be regarded as projective, though
the structure of GRW0 is compatible with doing so.
To sum up, the projective nature of the quantum state can be regarded as a conse-
quence of the axioms of OQT, BM, GRWm and GRWf, but not of GRW0.
5 Differences between BM and GRW
We have stressed the similarity between BM and GRW. There are, of course, also signif-
icant differences. Perhaps the most obvious is that in BM the Schro¨dinger evolution is
exact, but not in GRW. However, this difference is not so crucial. In fact we will present
in Section 7.1 a reformulation of GRWf in which the Schro¨dinger evolution is exact.
10And insofar as probabilities are concerned, if ψ is not normalized, these are given by |ψ(q)|2/〈ψ|ψ〉,
which is projective.
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A related important difference is that the empirical predictions of BM agree exactly
and always with those of the quantum formalism (whenever the latter is unambiguous)
while the predictions of the GRW theory don’t. (The latter agree only approximately
and in most cases.) In particular, one can empirically distinguish BM from the GRW
theory. (However, no decisive test could as yet be performed; see (Bassi and Ghirardi,
2003) for details.) The empirical disagreement between the two theories is usually
explained by appealing to the fact that in one theory the wave function obeys the
Schro¨dinger evolution while in the other it does not. However, especially in light of
the reformulation of GRWf we shall describe in Section 7.1, the empirical inequivalence
between the two theories should be better regarded as having a different origin. Though
we shall elaborate on this issue in Section 7.3, we shall anticipate the mathematical roots
of such a difference in Section 5.2 (which however may be skipped on a first reading of
this paper).
A difference in the mathematical structure of GRWf (and OQT) on the one hand and
BM (but also GRWm) on the other concerns the probability distribution that each of the
these theories defines on its space of histories of the PO. This probability distribution is
a quadratic functional of the initial ψ for GRWf and OQT, but not for BM and GRWm.
This feature is at the origin of why GRWf can be modified so as to become a fully
relativistically invariant theory (see the end of Section 4.2). It will be discussed in the
following subsection, which, however, will not be needed for understanding the rest of
the paper.
5.1 Primitive Ontology and Quadratic Functionals
It is worth noting a feature of the mathematical structure of GRWf that it shares with
OQT, but that is absent in, for example, BM and GRWm. It concerns the dependence on
the (initial) wave function ψ of the probability distribution Pψ that the theory defines
on its space Ω of histories of the PO. In BM, Ω is the space of continuous paths in
configuration space R3N , and the measure Pψ corresponds to the quantum equilibrium
measure, and is concentrated on a 3N -dimensional submanifold of Ω, namely the solu-
tions of Bohm’s equation (1). In GRWf, Ω is the space of discrete subsets of space-time
(possibly with labels 1, . . . , N), and the measure Pψ is given by (11). In GRWm, Ω is
a space of fields on space-time, and Pψ the image under the mapping ψ 7→ m given by
(12) of the distribution of the Markov process (ψt)t≥0.
In GRWf and OQT, but not in BM or GRWm, Pψ is a quadratic functional of ψ.
More precisely, in GRWf and OQT it is of the form
P
ψ(·) = 〈ψ|E(·)ψ〉 (19)
where E(·) is the positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) on Ω that can be read off
from (11) for GRWf, and is the POVM associated with the results of a sequence of
measurements for OQT (see, e.g., Du¨rr et al., 2004b). Neither GRWm nor BM share
this property. The easiest way of seeing this begins with noting that (19) entails that
any two ensembles of wave functions (corresponding to probability measures µ, µ′ on the
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unit sphere S of Hilbert space) with the same density matrix,
ρˆµ =
∫
S
µ(dψ) |ψ〉〈ψ| = ρˆµ′ , (20)
lead to the same distribution
Pµ(·) =
∫
S
µ(dψ)Pψ(·) = tr(E(·)ρˆµ) = Pµ′(·) (21)
on Ω. This is notoriously not true in BM (Bell, 1980). It is not true in GRWm either, as
one easily checks, for example by considering, at just one single time, the following two
ensembles of wave functions for Schro¨dinger’s cat: µ gives probability 1
2
to 2−1/2(|dead〉+
|alive〉) and 1
2
to 2−1/2(|dead〉 − |alive〉), while µ′ gives 1
2
to |dead〉 and 1
2
to |alive〉.
One can say that the essence of this difference between these theories lies in different
choices of which quantity is given by a simple, namely quadratic, expression in ψ:
• the probability distribution Pψ of the history of the PO both in GRWf and OQT,
see (19)
• the probability distribution ρψ of the PO at time t in BM,
ρψ(q, t) = |ψ(q, t)|2 (22)
• the PO itself at time t in GRWm,
m(x, t) = 〈ψt|Λ˜(x)ψt〉 with Λ˜(x) =
N∑
i=1
mi δ(x− Q̂i) . (23)
Note in particular the rather different roles that ‘|ψ|2’ can play for different quantum
theories and different choices of the PO.
5.2 Primitive Ontology and Equivariance
In Section 2 we have recalled the notion of the equivariance of the probability distribution
|ψ|2 and indicated how it is the key notion for establishing the empirical agreement
between BM and the predictions of the quantum formalism (whenever the latter are
unambiguous). The equivariance of |ψ|2 expresses the mutual compatibility, with respect
to |ψ|2, of the Schro¨dinger evolution of the wave function and the Bohmian motion of
the configuration.
It would seem natural to expect that for GRWf we also have equivariance, but rela-
tive to the (stochastic) GRW evolution of the wave function instead of the Schro¨dinger
evolution. However, the concept of the equivariance of the distribution |ψ|2 is not di-
rectly applicable in this case: in fact, for GRWf there is no random variable Q(t) whose
distribution could agree or disagree with a |ψt|2 distribution (or any other quantum me-
chanical distribution), since GRWf is a theory of flashes, not particles, and as such yields
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no nontrivial random variable that can be regarded as associated with a fixed time t. In
this framework it seems natural to consider the notion of a time–translation equivariant
distribution, in terms of which we may provide a generalized notion of equivariance as
follows: Let Ωt be the space of possible histories of the PO for times greater than or equal
to t. In trajectory theories like BM, Ωt is the space of continuous paths [t,∞) → Q,
where Q is the configuration space; in flash theories like GRWf it is the space of finite–
or–countable subsets of the half space-time [t,∞)×R3. Consider an association ψ 7→ Pψ
where Pψ is a probability measure on Ω0 that is compatible with the dynamics of the
theory. We say that this association is equivariant relative to a deterministic evolution
ψ 7→ ψt if S⋆t P
ψ = Pψt , where ⋆ denotes the action of the mapping on measures and St is
a suitably defined time shift.11 More generally, for an evolution that may be stochastic,
we say that the association is equivariant relative to the evolution if
S⋆t P
ψ = EPψt , (24)
where E denotes the average over the random ψt. With this definition, BM is equivariant
relative to the Schro¨dinger evolution, and GRWf and GRWm are equivariant relative to
the GRW evolution.
6 A Plethora of Theories
One may wonder whether some primitive ontologies (flashes and continuous matter
density) work only with GRW-type theories while others (particle trajectories) work
only with Bohm-type theories. This is not the case, as we shall explain in this section.
6.1 Particles, Fields, and Flashes
Let us analyze, with the aid of Table 1, several possibilities: there can be at least
three different kinds of primitive ontologies for a fundamental physical theory, namely
particles, fields, and flashes. Those primitive ontologies can evolve either according to
a deterministic or to a stochastic law and this law can be implemented with the aid of
a wave function evolving either stochastically or deterministically.
BM is the prototype of a theory in which we have a particle ontology that evolves
deterministically according to a law specified by a wave function that also evolves de-
terministically. The natural analog for a theory with particle ontology with indeter-
ministic evolution is stochastic mechanics (SM), in which the law of evolution of the
particles is given by a diffusion process while the evolution of the wave function, the
usual Schro¨dinger evolution, remains deterministic (see Nelson, 1985; Goldstein, 1987,
for details). Another example involving stochastically evolving particles with a deter-
ministically evolving wave function is provided by a Bell-type quantum field theory
(BTQFT) in which, despite the name, the PO is given by particles evolving indetermin-
istically to allow for creation and annihilation (for a description, see Du¨rr et al., 2004a,
11In order to define St properly, let Rt, t > 0, be the restriction mapping Ω0 → Ωt, and Tτ the time
translation mapping Ωt → Ωt+τ . Then St = T−t ◦Rt : Ω0 → Ω0 is the time shift.
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Particles Fields Flashes
Deterministic BM BQFT, Sm
Indeterministic SM, BTQFT, BMW, GRWp GRWm GRWf, Sf, Sf′
Table 1: Different possibilities for the PO of a theory are presented: particles, fields and
flashes. These different primitive ontologies can evolve according to either deterministic or
stochastic laws. Corresponding to these possibilities we have a variety of physical theories:
Bohmian mechanics (BM), Bohmian quantum field theory (BQFT), a mass density field theory
with Schro¨dinger evolving wave function (Sm), stochastic mechanics (SM), Bell-type quantum
field theory (BTQFT), Bell’s version of many-worlds (BMW), a particle GRW theory (GRWp),
GRW theory with mass density (GRWm), GRW theory with flashes (GRWf), and two theories
with flashes governed by Schro¨dinger (or Dirac) wave functions (Sf and Sf′). For a detailed
description of these theories, see the text.
2005b; Bell, 1986). Another possibility for a stochastic theory of particles is a theory
GRWp in which the particle motion is governed by (1) but with a wave function that
obeys a GRW-like evolution in which the collapses occur exactly as in GRW except that,
once the time and label for the collapse has been chosen, the collapse is centered at the
actual position of the particle with the chosen label, rather than at random according
to equation (7). (A garbled formulation of this theory is presented in (Bohm and Hiley,
1993, p. 346).)
What in Table 1 we call a Bohmian quantum field theory (BQFT) involves only
fields, evolving deterministically (Bohm, 1952; Struyve and Westman, 2006). Another
example is provided by the theory Sm in which the PO is given by the mass density
field (12) but evolving with a Schro¨dinger wave function — always evolving according
to Schro¨dinger’s equation, with no collapses. GRWm provides an example of a theory of
fields that evolve stochastically.
Concerning theories with flashes, these are inevitably stochastic, and GRWf, in which
the flashes track the collapses of the wave function, is the prototype. However, there
are also theories with flashes in which the wave function never collapses. Such theories
are thus arguably closer to BM than to GRWf. We consider two examples.
In the first example, denoted by Sf,12 the PO consists of flashes with their distribution
determined by a Schro¨dinger wave function ψ = ψ(q1, . . . , qN), that evolves always
unitarily, as in BM, according to the N–‘particle’ Schro¨dinger evolution (2). The flashes
are generated by the wave function exactly as in GRWf. Thus, the algorithm, whose
output is the flashes, is the same as the one described in Section 3, with steps 1., 2. and
3., with the following difference: the first sentence in step 2. is dropped, since no collapse
takes place. In other words, in Sf flashes occur with rate (8) but are accompanied by no
12Here S stands for Schro¨dinger (evolution). Using this notation we have that BM = Sp.
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changes in the wave function.13 (This flash process defines, in fact, a Poisson process
in space-time—more precisely, a Poisson system of points in R4 × {1, . . . , , N}—with
intensity measure r((x, t), i) = r(x, i|ψt) given by (8).) Note that, in contrast to the
case of GRWf, one obtains a well defined theory by taking the limit σ → 0 in (4), that is
by replacing Λi(x) in (8) with Λ˜i(x) given by Λ˜i(x) = δ(Q̂i−x), where Q̂i is the position
operator of the i-th ‘particle.’
Our last example (Sf′) is the following. Consider a nonrelativistic system of N
noninteracting quantum particles with wave function satisfying the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
N∑
i=1
~2
2mi
∇2iψ +
N∑
i=1
Vi(qi)ψ , (25)
and suppose that, as in GRWf, each of the flashes is associated with one of the particle
labels 1, . . . , N . Given the flashes up to the present, the next flash occurs with rate Nλ,
and has a label I ∈ {1, . . . , N} that is randomly chosen with uniform distribution. If
this flash occurs at time TI , its location X is random with probability distribution
P(X ∈ dXI |I, TI , {Xk, Tk}k 6=I) = N
∣∣ψ(X1, T1, . . . , XN , TN)∣∣2 dXI , (26)
where N is a normalizing factor, ψ = ψ(q1, t1, . . . , qN , tN) is a multi-time wave function
evolving according to the set of N equations
i~
∂ψ
∂ti
= −
~2
2mi
∇2iψ + Vi(qi)ψ (27)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and Tk and Xk are, for k 6= I, the time and location of the
last flash with label k. The reason that this model is assumed to be noninteracting
is precisely to guarantee the existence of the multi-time wave function in (26). Sf′ is
an example of a theory with a flash ontology that arguably is empirically equivalent to
OQT (unlike GRWf)—at least, it would be if it were extended to incorporate interactions
between particles—and avoids the many-worlds character of Sf (see Section 6.2 below).
A provisional moral that emerges is that relativistic invariance might be connected
with a flash ontology, since GRWf is the only theory in Table 1 (except for Sm and
Sf, which have a rather extraordinary character that we discuss in Section 6.2 below)
of which we know how it can be made relativistically invariant without postulating a
preferred foliation of space-time (or any other equivalent additional structure). Finally,
note that all the theories in Table 1 are empirically equivalent (suitably understood) to
OQT except GRWm, GRWf, and GRWp.
13Accordingly, equation (11) is replaced by
P
(
X1 ∈ dx1, T1 ∈ dt1, I1 = i1, . . . , Xn ∈ dxn, Tn ∈ dtn, In = in|ψt0
)
= λne−Nλ(tn−t0)
n∏
k=1
〈ψtk |Λik(xk)ψtk〉 dx1dt1 · · · dxndtn ,
where Λi(x) is the collapse operator given by (4).
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6.2 Schro¨dinger Wave Functions and Many-Worlds
A rather peculiar theory representing the world as if it were, at any given time, a
collection of particles with classical configuration Q = (Q1, . . . , QN ) is Bell’s version of
many-worlds (BMW) (Bell, 1981). In BMW the wave function ψ evolves according to
Schro¨dinger’s equation and (Bell, 1981)
instantaneous classical configurations . . . are supposed to exist, and to be
distributed . . . with probability |ψ|2. But no pairing of configurations at
different times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is sup-
posed.
This can be understood as suggesting that the configurations at different times are not
connected by any law. It could also be regarded as suggesting that configurations at
different times are (statistically) independent, and that is how we shall understand it
here. The world described by BMW is so radically different from what we are accustomed
to that it is hard to take BMW seriously. In fact, for example, at some time during the
past second, according to BMW, there were on the earth dinosaurs instead of humans,
because of the independence and the fact that, in any no-collapse version of quantum
theory, there are parts of the wave function of the universe in which the dinosaurs have
never become extinct. In this theory, the actual past will typically entirely disagree
with what is suggested by our memories, by history books, by photographs and by
other records of (what we call) the past.
Also Sf and Sm, though they are simple mathematical modifications of GRWf and
GRWm respectively, provide very different pictures of reality, so different indeed from
what we usually believe reality should be like that it would seem hard to take these
theories seriously. In Sf and Sm, apparatus pointers never point in a specific direction
(except when a certain direction in OQT would have probability more or less one), but
rather all directions are, so to speak, realized at once. As a consequence, one is led to
conclude that their predictions don’t agree with those of the quantum formalism. Still,
it can be argued that these theories do not predict any observable deviation from the
quantum formalism: there is, arguably, no conceivable experiment that could help us
decide whether our world is governed by Sf or Sm on the one hand or by the quantum
formalism on the other. The reason for this surprising claim is that Sf and Sm can be
regarded as many-worlds formulations of quantum mechanics. Let us explain.
At first glance, in an Sf or Sm world, the after-measurement state of the apparatus
seems only to suggest that matter is very spread out. However, if one considers the
flashes, governed by the rate (8), or the mass density (12), that correspond to macro-
scopic superpositions, one sees that they form independent families of correlated flashes
or mass density associated with the terms of the superposition, with no interaction be-
tween the families. The families can indeed be regarded as comprising many worlds,
superimposed on a single space-time. Metaphorically speaking, the universe according
to Sf or Sm resembles the situation of a TV set that is not correctly tuned, so that one
always sees a mixture of two channels. In principle, one might watch two movies at the
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same time in this way, with each movie conveying its own story composed of temporally
and spatially correlated events.
Thus Sf and Sm are analogous to Everett’s many-worlds (EMW) formulation of quan-
tum mechanics (Everett, 1957), but with the ‘worlds’ explicitly realized in the same
space-time. Since the different worlds do not interact among themselves—they are, so
to speak, reciprocally transparent—this difference should not be regarded as crucial.
Thus, to the extent that one is willing to grant that EMW entails no observable devia-
tion from the quantum formalism, the same should be granted to Sf and Sm. Moreover,
contrarily to EMW, but similarly to BMW, Sf and Sm have a clear PO upon which
the existence and behavior of the macroscopic counterparts of our experience can be
grounded.
This ontological clarity notwithstanding, in Sf and Sm reality is of course very dif-
ferent from what we usually believe it to be like. It is populated with ghosts we do not
perceive, or rather, with what are like ghosts from our perspective, because the ghosts
are as real as we are, and from their perspective we are the ghosts. We plan to give a
more complete discussion of Sf and Sm in a future work.
We note that the theory Sm is closely related to—if not precisely the same as—the
version of quantum mechanics proposed by Schro¨dinger (1926). After all, Schro¨dinger
originally regarded his theory as describing a continuous distribution of matter (or
charge) spread out in physical space in accord with the wave function on configura-
tion space (Schro¨dinger, 1926). He soon rejected this theory because he thought that it
rather clearly conflicted with experiment. Schro¨dinger’s rejection of this theory was per-
haps a bit hasty. Be that as it may, according to what we have said above, Schro¨dinger
did in fact create the first many-worlds theory, though he probably was not aware that
he had done so. (We wonder whether he would have been pleased if he had been).14
7 The Flexible Wave Function
In this section we elaborate on the notion of physical equivalence by considering phys-
ically equivalent formulations of GRWf and BM for which the laws of evolution of the
wave function are very different from the standard ones. We conclude with some remarks
on the notion of empirical equivalence.
7.1 GRWf Without Collapse
As a consequence of the view that the GRW theory is ultimately not about wave functions
but about either flashes or matter density, the process ψt in Hilbert space (representing
14However, Schro¨dinger did write that (Schro¨dinger, 1927, p. 120) ‘ψψ¯ is a kind of weight-function in
the system’s configuration space. The wave-mechanical configuration of the system is a superposition
of many, strictly speaking of all, point-mechanical configurations kinematically possible. Thus, each
point-mechanical configuration contributes to the true wave-mechanical configuration with a certain
weight, which is given precisely by ψψ¯. If we like paradoxes, we may say that the system exists, as it
were, simultaneously in all the positions kinematically imaginable, but not ‘equally strongly’ in all.’
26
the collapsing wave function) should no longer be regarded as playing the central role
in the GRW theory. Instead, the central role is played by the random set F of flashes
for GRWf, respectively by the random matter density function m(·, t) for GRWm. From
this understanding of GRWf as being fundamentally about flashes, we obtain a lot of
flexibility as to how we should regard the wave function and prescribe its behavior. As
we point out in this section, it is not necessary to regard the wave function in GRWf as
undergoing collapse; instead, one can formulate GRWf in such a way that it involves a
wave function ψ that evolves linearly (i.e., following the usual Schro¨dinger evolution).
Suppose the wave function at time t is ψt. Then according to equation (8), for GRWf
the rate for the next flash is given by
r(x, i|ψt) = λ‖Λi(x)
1/2ψt‖
2. (28)
Observe that ψt, given by equation (9), is determined by ψt0 and the flashes (Xk, Tk)
that occur between the times t0 and t; it can be rewritten as follows:
ψt =
ΛIn(Xn, Tn; t)
1/2 · · · ΛI1(X1, T1; t)
1/2ψLt
‖ΛIn(Xn, Tn; t)1/2 · · · ΛI1(X1, T1; t)
1/2ψLt ‖
(29)
where we have introduced the Heisenberg-evolved operators (with respect to time t)
ΛIk(Xk, Tk; t)
1/2 = Ut−TkΛIk(Xk)
1/2UTk−t = Ut−TkΛIk(Xk)
1/2U−1t−Tk (30)
and the linearly evolved wave function
ψLt = Ut−t0ψt0 , (31)
where t0 is the initial (universal) time. By inserting ψt given by equation (29) in (28)
one obtains that
r(x, i|ψt) = λ
‖Λi(x)1/2ΛIn(Xn, Tn; t)
1/2 · · · ΛI1(X1, T1; t)
1/2ψLt ‖
2
‖ΛIn(Xn, Tn; t)1/2 · · · ΛI1(X1, T1; t)
1/2ψLt ‖2
. (32)
Suppose that the initial wave function is ψt0 , i.e., that the linearly evolved wave
function at time t is ψLt . Then the right hand side of equation (32) defines the conditional
rate for the next flash after time t, given the flashes in the past of t. Note that this
conditional rate thus defines precisely the same flash process as GRWf. In particular,
we have that
PψLt
(future flashes|past flashes) = P(future flashes|ψt). (33)
The collapsed wave function ψt provides precisely the same information as the linearly
evolving wave function ψLt together with all the flashes. Thus, one arrives at the sur-
prising conclusion that the Schro¨dinger wave function can be regarded as governing the
evolution of the space-time point process of GRWf, so that GRWf can indeed be re-
garded as a no-collapse theory involving flashes. We say ‘no-collapse’ to underline that
the dynamics of the PO is then governed by a wave function evolving according to the
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standard, linear Schro¨dinger equation (2). However, while the probability distribution
of the future flashes, given the collapsing wave function ψt, does not depend on the past
flashes, given only ψLt it does.
The two versions of GRWf, one using the collapsing wave function ψt and the other
using the non–collapsing wave function ψLt , should be regarded not as two different
theories but rather as two formulations of the same theory, GRWf, because they lead to
the same distribution of the flashes and thus are physically equivalent. We conclude from
this discussion that what many have considered to be the crucial, irreducible difference
between BM and GRWf, namely that the wave function collapses in GRWf but does not
in BM, is not in fact an objective difference at all, but rather a matter of how GRWf is
presented.
We close this section with a remark. A notable difference between the two presen-
tations of GRWf is that while the GRW collapse process ψt is a Markov process,
15 the
point-process F of flashes is generically non–Markovian. In more detail, we regard a
point process in space-time as Markovian if for all t1 < t2,
P
(
future of t2
∣∣past of t2) = P(future of t2∣∣strip between t1 and t2) , (34)
where ‘future of t2’ refers to the configuration of points after time t2, etc.. To see that
F is non–Markovian, note that the distribution of the flashes in the future of t2 depends
on what happened between time 0 and time t2, while the strip in space-time between t1
and t2 may provide little or no useful information, as it may, for small duration t2 − t1,
contain no flashes at all.16
For a Markovian flash process events in a time interval [t1, t2] are independent of
those in a disjoint time interval [t3, t4], which, as discussed in Section 6, would be rather
unreasonable for a model of our world. In passing, we note that Sf can indeed be regarded
as a sort of Markovian approximation of (the linear version of) GRWf for which, at any
time, the past is completely ignored in the computation of the conditional probability
of future flashes.
7.2 Bohmian Mechanics With Collapse
In Section 7.1 we showed that GRWf can be reformulated in terms of a linearly evolving
wave function. Conversely, BM can be reformulated so that it involves a ‘collapsed’
wave function. In this formulation the evolution of the wave function depends on the
actual configuration. The state at time t is described by the pair (Qt, ψ
C
t ), where
Q = (Q1, . . . , QN) is the (usual) configuration but ψ
C
t : R
3N → C is a different wave
15This means that P
(
future
∣∣past & present) = P(future∣∣present). In more detail, the distribution of
the ψt for all t > t0 conditional on the ψt for all t ≤ t0 coincides with the distribution of the future
conditional on ψt0 .
16The matter density fieldm(·, t) is generically Markovian, but rather by coincidence: Given the initial
wave function, different patterns of collapse centers between time 0 and time t2 should be expected to
lead to different fields m(·, t2), so that the past (or equivalently ψt2) may be mathematically determined
from m(·, t2).
28
function than usual, a collapsed wave function. Instead of equations (1) and (2), the
state evolves according to
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
ψC∗∇iψC
ψC∗ψC
(Q1, . . . , QN ) , (35)
which is the same as (1) with ψ replaced by ψC , and
i~
∂ψC
∂t
= −
N∑
i=1
~2
2mi
(∇i − iA˜i)
2ψC + (V + V˜ )ψC (36)
which is the same as Schro¨dinger’s equation except for the imaginary pseudo-potentials
(σ ≈ 10−7 m is the same constant as in GRW)
A˜i =
i
σ2
(qi −Qi) , V˜ = −
i
σ2
N∑
i=1
~2
mi
(qi −Qi) · Im
ψC∗∇iψC
ψC∗ψC
(37)
making equation (36) nonlinear and Q-dependent. A solution t 7→ (Qt, ψCt ) of equations
(35) and (36) can be obtained from a solution t 7→ (Qt, ψt) of equations (1) and (2) by
setting
ψC(q1, . . . , qN) = exp
(
−
N∑
i=1
(qi −Qi)2
2σ2
)
ψ(q1, . . . , qN) . (38)
This is readily checked by inserting (38) into equations (35) and (36). The ensemble of
trajectories with distribution |ψ|2 cannot be expressed in a simple way in terms of ψC .
Nonetheless, for given initial configuration Q0, we obtain from equations (35) and (36),
with given initial ψC0 , the same trajectory t 7→ Qt as from equations (1) and (2) with
the corresponding ψ0. This may be enough to speak of physical equivalence.
One can read off from (38) that ψC is a collapsed wave function: Whenever ψ
is a superposition (such as for Schro¨dinger’s cat) of macroscopically different states
with disjoint supports in configuration space, then in ψC all contributions except the
one containing the actual configuration Qt are damped down to near zero. (Still, the
evolution is such that when two disjoint packets again overlap, the trajectories display
an interference pattern.)
Of course, the unitarily-evolving ψt is much more natural than ψ
C
t as a mathematical
tool for defining the trajectory t 7→ Qt; (2) is a simpler equation than (36). Still, the
example shows that we have the choice in BM between using a collapsed wave function
ψC or a spread out wave function ψ.
7.3 Empirical Equivalence and Equivariance
The facts that GRWf can be reformulated so that the wave function evolves linearly, in
the usual manner according to Schro¨dinger’s equation, and that BM can be reformu-
lated in terms of a collapsed wave function indicate that the disagreement between the
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predictions of the two theories should not be regarded as arising merely from the fact
that they involve different wave function evolutions. It is our contention that the source
of the empirical disagreement between BM and GRWf can be regarded as lying, neither
in their having different evolutions for the wave function, nor in their having different
ontologies, but rather in the presence or absence of equivariance with respect to the
Schro¨dinger evolution. More explicitly, we claim that a theory is empirically equivalent
to the quantum formalism (i.e., that its predictions agree with those of the quantum
formalism) if it yields an equivariant distribution (defining typicality) relative to the
Schro¨dinger evolution that can be regarded as ‘effectively |ψ|2.’ Let us explain.
The view we have proposed about the PO of a theory and the corresponding role of
the wave function has immediate consequences for the criteria for the empirical equiva-
lence of two theories, i.e., the statement that they make (exactly and always) the same
predictions for the outcomes of experiments.
Before discussing these consequences, let us note a couple of remarkable aspects of
the notion of empirical equivalence. One is that, despite the difficulty of formulating the
empirical content of a theory precisely (a difficulty mainly owed to the vagueness of the
notion ‘macroscopic’), one can sometimes establish the empirical equivalence of theories;
for example, that of BM and SM or that of GRWm and GRWf; for further examples see
(Goldstein et al., 2005). Another remarkable aspect is that empirical equivalence occurs
at all. One might have expected instead that different theories typically make different
predictions, and indeed the theories of classical physics would provide plenty exam-
ples. But in quantum mechanics empirical equivalence is a widespread phenomenon; see
(Goldstein et al., 2005) for discussion of this point.
Let us turn to the criteria for empirical equivalence. Since the empirical equivalence
of two theories basically amounts to the assertion that the two worlds, governed by
the two theories, share the same macroscopic appearance, we have to focus on how to
read off the macroscopic appearance of a possible world according to a theory. And
according to our view about PO, the macroscopic appearance is a function of the PO—
but not directly a function of the wave function. In cases in which one can deduce the
macroscopic appearance of a system from its wave function, this is so only by virtue of
a law of the theory implying that this wave function is accompanied by a PO with a
certain macroscopic appearance. In short, empirical equivalence amounts to a statement
about the PO. This view is exemplified by our proof of empirical equivalence between
GRWm and GRWf in Section 3.3. In more detail, the position Zt of, say, a pointer at
time (circa) t is a function of the PO: In BM and GRWm it can be regarded as a function
Zt = Z(Qt) of the configuration, respectively as a function Zt = Z(m(·, t)) of the m
field, at time t, whereas in GRWf it is best regarded as a function of the history of flashes
over the past millisecond or so.
Concerning the empirical equivalence between a theory and OQT, we need to ask
whether the probability of the event Zt = z agrees with the distribution predicted by
standard quantum mechanics. The latter can be obtained from the Schro¨dinger wave
function ψt for a sufficiently big system containing the pointer by integrating |ψt|2 over
all configurations in which the pointer points to z. Thus, regardless of what the PO of a
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theory is, all that is required for the empirical equivalence between the theory and OQT
is that it provide the correct |ψt|2 probability distributions for the relevant variables
Zt. When this is so we may speak of an ‘effective |ψt|2–distribution,’ or of macroscopic
|ψ|2 Schro¨dinger equivariance. Thus, empirical equivalence to OQT amounts to having
macroscopic |ψ|2 Schro¨dinger equivariance. (This applies to ‘normal’ theories in which
pointers point; the situation is different for theories with a many-worlds character as
discussed in Section 6.2.)
GRWf (or GRWm) predicts (approximately) the quantum mechanical distribution
only under certain circumstances, including, e.g., that the experimental control over
decoherence is limited, and that the universe is young on the timescale of the ‘uni-
versal warming’ predicted by GRWf/GRWm (see Bassi and Ghirardi, 2003, for details).
Moreover, we know that GRWf, roughly speaking, makes the same predictions as does
the quantum formalism for short times, i.e., before too many collapses have occurred.
Thus, GRWf yields an effective |ψ|2–distribution for times near the initial time t0. Now,
if GRWf were ‘effectively |ψ|2–equivariant,’ its predictions would be the same as those
of quantum theory for all times. It is the absence of this macroscopic |ψ|2 Schro¨dinger
equivariance that renders GRWf empirically inequivalent to quantum theory and to BM.
We shall elaborate on this in a future work (Allori et al., unpublished,a).
The most succinct expression of the source of the empirical disagreement between
BM and GRWf is thus the assertion that BM is effectively |ψ|2-equivariant relative to
the Schro¨dinger evolution while GRWf is not. The macroscopic Schro¨dinger equivariance
of BM follows, of course, from its microscopic |ψ|2 Schro¨dinger equivariance, while the
lack of macroscopic |ψ|2 Schro¨dinger equivariance for GRWf follows from the warming
associated with the GRW evolution and the fact that GRWf, as discussed in Section
5.2, is microscopically equivariant relative to that evolution. In fact, it follows from the
GRW warming that there is, for GRWf, no equivariant association ψ 7→ Pψ with ψ a
Schro¨dinger-evolving wave function.17
8 What is a Quantum Theory without Observers?
To conclude, we delineate the common structure of GRWm, GRWf, and BM:
(i) There is a clear primitive ontology, and it describes matter in space and time.
(ii) There is a state vector ψ in Hilbert space that evolves either unitarily or, at least,
for microscopic systems very probably for a long time approximately unitarily.
(iii) The state vector ψ governs the behavior of the PO by means of (possibly stochastic)
laws.
17Since the GRWf flash process is non–Markovian, the formulation of the notion of equivariant as-
sociation given in Section 5.2 is not appropriate here; instead, Pψ should now be understood to be a
probability measure on the space Ω of possible histories of the PO for all times, but one whose condi-
tional probabilities for the future of any time given its past are as prescribed, here by the formula (33).
The association is equivariant if T ⋆−tP
ψ = Pψt , with Tτ now the time translation mapping on Ω.
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(iv) The theory provides a notion of a typical history of the PO (of the universe), for
example by a probability distribution on the space of all possible histories; from
this notion of typicality the probabilistic predictions emerge.
(v) The predicted probability distribution of the macroscopic configuration at time t
determined by the PO (usually) agrees (at least approximately) with that of the
quantum formalism.
The features (i)–(v) are common to these three theories, but they are also desiderata,
presumably even necessary conditions, for any satisfactory quantum theory without
observers.18
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